The design and implementation of tripwire: a file system integrity checker
CCS '94 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security
On the effectiveness of address-space randomization
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
SubVirt: Implementing malware with virtual machines
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
HACKING EXPOSED MALWARE AND ROOTKITS
HACKING EXPOSED MALWARE AND ROOTKITS
Absolute pwnage: a short paper about the security risks of remote administration tools
FC'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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Out-of-band, lights-out management has become a standard feature on many servers, but while this technology can be a boon for system administrators, it also presents a new and interesting vector for attack. This paper examines the security implications of the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI), which is implemented on server motherboards using an embedded Baseboard Management Controller (BMC). We consider the threats posed by an incorrectly implemented IPMI and present evidence that IPMI vulnerabilities may be widespread. We analyze a major OEM's IPMI implementation and discover that it is riddled with textbook vulnerabilities, some of which would allow a remote attacker to gain root access to the BMC and potentially take control of the host system. Using data from Internet-wide scans, we find that there are at least 100,000 IPMI-enabled servers (across three large vendors) running on publicly accessible IP addresses, contrary to recommended best practice. Finally, we suggest defensive strategies for servers currently deployed and propose avenues for future work.