Agent-Based simulation analysis for equilibrium selection and coordination failure in coordination games characterized by the minimum strategy

Authors:
Ichiro Nishizaki;Tomohiro Hayashida;Noriyuki Hara
Affiliations:
Hiroshima University, Higashi-Hiroshima, Japan;Hiroshima University, Higashi-Hiroshima, Japan;Hiroshima University, Higashi-Hiroshima, Japan
Venue:
Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence IX
Year:
2013

Citing 3
Cited 0

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Abstract

In order to analyze equilibrium selection and coordination failure in coordination games, we develop an agent-based simulation system in which artificial adaptive agents have a decision making and learning mechanism based on neural networks and genetic algorithms. Using this simulation system, we examine the strategy choices of agents and formation of equilibria in a steady state, and compare our simulation result with the experimental result given by Van Huyck et al. (1990).