How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Internal correlation in repeated games
International Journal of Game Theory
On complexity as bounded rationality (extended abstract)
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A Pseudorandom Generator from any One-way Function
SIAM Journal on Computing
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
A Cryptographic Solution to a Game Theoretic Problem
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Computing Nash Equilibria: Approximation and Smoothed Complexity
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A polynomial-time Nash equilibrium algorithm for repeated games
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
New directions in cryptography
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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We study the problem of computing an ε-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players as polynomial-time Turing machines that maintain state (rather than stateless polynomial-time Turing machines)---and make some standard cryptographic hardness assumptions (the existence of public key encryption), the problem can actually be solved in polynomial time.