Detecting identity-based attacks in wireless networks using signalprints
WiSe '06 Proceedings of the 5th ACM workshop on Wireless security
Wireless device identification with radiometric signatures
Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Radio frequency fingerprinting commercial communication devices to enhance electronic security
International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics
Transient-based identification of wireless sensor nodes
IPSN '09 Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Information Processing in Sensor Networks
Attacks on physical-layer identification
Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Wireless network security
Physical-layer identification of RFID devices
SSYM'09 Proceedings of the 18th conference on USENIX security symposium
Physical-layer identification of UHF RFID tags
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Exploiting the physical layer for enhanced security
IEEE Wireless Communications
Feature extraction approaches to RF fingerprinting for device identification in femtocells
Bell Labs Technical Journal
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Recently, physical layer security commonly known as Radio Frequency (RF) fingerprinting has been proposed to provide an additional layer of security for wireless devices. A unique RF fingerprint can be used to establish the identity of a specific wireless device in order to prevent masquerading/impersonation attacks. In the literature, the performance of RF fingerprinting techniques is typically assessed using high-end (expensive) receiver hardware. However, in most practical situations receivers will not be high-end and will suffer from device specific impairments which affect the RF fingerprinting process. This paper evaluates the accuracy of RF fingerprinting employing low-end receivers. The vulnerability to an impersonation attack is assessed for a modulation-based RF fingerprinting system employing low-end commodity hardware (by legitimate and malicious users alike). Our results suggest that receiver impairment effectively decreases the success rate of impersonation attack on RF fingerprinting. In addition, the success rate of impersonation attack is receiver dependent.