Shared resource matrix methodology: an approach to identifying storage and timing channels
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A note on the confinement problem
Communications of the ACM
A Practical Approach to Identifying Storage and Timing Channels: Twenty Years Later
ACSAC '02 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Detecting covert timing channels: an entropy-based approach
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Understanding Android Security
IEEE Security and Privacy
Semantically Rich Application-Centric Security in Android
ACSAC '09 Proceedings of the 2009 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
TaintDroid: an information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on smartphones
OSDI'10 Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on Operating systems design and implementation
Taming information-stealing smartphone applications (on Android)
TRUST'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Trust and trustworthy computing
Quire: lightweight provenance for smart phone operating systems
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Using labeling to prevent cross-service attacks against smart phones
DIMVA'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment
"Andromaly": a behavioral malware detection framework for android devices
Journal of Intelligent Information Systems
New constructive approach to covert channel modeling and channel capacity estimation
ISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security
Security'12 Proceedings of the 21st USENIX conference on Security symposium
MADAM: a multi-level anomaly detector for android malware
MMM-ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Computer Network Security: computer network security
Detecting covert communication on Android
LCN '12 Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE 37th Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN 2012)
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By exploiting known covert channels, Android applications today are able to bypass the built-in permission system and share data in a potentially untraceable manner. These channels have sufficient bandwidth to transmit sensitive information, such as GPS locations, in real-time to collaborating applications with Internet access. In this paper, we extend previous work involving an application layer covert communications detector. We measure the stability of the volume and vibration channels on the Android emulator, HTC G1, and Motorola Droid. In addition, we quantify the effect that our detector has on channel capacities for stealthy malicious applications using a theoretical model. Lastly, we introduce a new classification of covert and overt communication for the Android platform.