On Equilibria in Quantitative Games with Reachability/Safety Objectives

  • Authors:
  • Thomas Brihaye;Véronique Bruyère;Julie De Pril

  • Affiliations:
  • University of Mons--UMONS, Mons, Belgium 7000;University of Mons--UMONS, Mons, Belgium 7000;University of Mons--UMONS, Mons, Belgium 7000

  • Venue:
  • Theory of Computing Systems
  • Year:
  • 2014

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Abstract

In this paper, we study turn-based multiplayer quantitative non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In this framework each player aims at reaching his own goal as soon as possible. We focus on existence results for two solution concepts: Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of finite-memory Nash (resp. secure) equilibria in n-player (resp. 2-player) games. For the case of Nash equilibria, we extend our result in two directions. First, we show that finite-memory Nash equilibria still exist when the model is enriched by allowing n-tuples of positive costs on edges (one cost by player). Secondly, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in quantitative games with both reachability and safety objectives.