The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Practical multi-candidate election system
Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Non-Interactive and Information-Theoretic Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Tools for privacy preserving distributed data mining
ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter
Detecting deception in reputation management
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
A survey of trust and reputation systems for online service provision
Decision Support Systems
New foundations for efficient authentication, commutative cryptography, and private disjointness testing
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
SuperTrust - a secure and efficient framework for handling trust in super peer networks
ICDCN'08 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Distributed computing and networking
An improved algorithm for computing logarithms over and its cryptographic significance (Corresp.)
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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In this paper, we describe a decentralized privacy-preserving protocol for securely casting trust ratings in distributed reputation systems. Our protocol allows n participants to cast their votes in a way that preserves the privacy of individual values against both internal and external attacks. The protocol is coupled with an extensive theoretical analysis in which we formally prove that our protocol is resistant to collusion against as many as n-1 corrupted nodes in both the semi-honest and malicious adversarial models. The behavior of our protocol is tested in a real P2P network by measuring its communication delay and processing overhead. The experimental results uncover the advantages of our protocol over previous works in the area; without sacrificing security, our decentralized protocol is shown to be almost one order of magnitude faster than the previous best protocol for providing anonymous feedback.