A new public key cryptosystem based on higher residues
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Xor-trees for efficient anonymous multicast and reception
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools
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Verifiable secret-ballot elections
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Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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TCC'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Theory of Cryptography
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AFRICACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Progress in cryptology in Africa
Wireless Personal Communications: An International Journal
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Schemes for multi-party trust computation are presented. The schemes do not make use of a Trusted Authority. The schemes are more efficient than previous schemes by the number of messages exchanged which is proportional to the number of participants rather than to a quadratic number of the participants. We note that in our schemes the length of each message may be larger than the message length of previous schemes. The calculation of a trust, in a specific user by a group of community members, starts upon a request of an initiating user. The trust computation is provided in a completely distributed manner, while each user calculates its trust value privately. Given a community C and its members (users) U1, ..., Un, we present computationally secure schemes for trust computation. The first Accumulated Protocol AP computes the average trust in a specific user Ut upon the trust evaluation request initiated by a user Un. The exact trust values of each queried user are not disclosed to Un. The next Weighted Accumulated protocol WAP generates the average weighted trust in a specific user Ut taking into consideration the unrevealed trust that Un has in each user participating in the trust process evaluation. We extend our schemes to the case when the initiating user Un can be compromised by the adversary, and we introduce the Multiple Private Keys M P K P and the Multiple Private Keys Weighted M P W P protocols for computing average unweighted and weighted trust, respectively. The computation of all our algorithms requires the transmission of O(n) (possibly large) messages.