Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
Artificial Intelligence
Logic and information flow
Modal logic
Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science
Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science
Reasoning about Information Change
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Refined Epistemic Entrenchment
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
The logic of public announcements, common knowledge, and private suspicions
TARK '98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Distributed Processes and the Logic of Knowledge
Proceedings of the Conference on Logic of Programs
A knowledge-based framework for belief change part I: foundations
TARK '94 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge
Logics of communication and change
Information and Computation
Adding temporal logic to dynamic epistemic logic
Adding temporal logic to dynamic epistemic logic
A Note on Bisimulation Quantifiers and Fixed Points over Transitive Frames
Journal of Logic and Computation
Revision sequences and nested conditionals
IJCAI'93 Proceedings of the 13th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
A combined system for update logic and belief revision
PRIMA'04 Proceedings of the 7th Pacific Rim international conference on Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Conditional epistemic planning
JELIA'12 Proceedings of the 13th European conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
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Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (`revoke') the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the requirements are for revocable belief revision. By this we not merely mean recovering belief in non-modal propositions, as in the recovery principle for belief contraction, but recovering belief in modal propositions: beliefs about beliefs. These requirements are almost never met, a surprising result.