Artificial Intelligence
Propositional knowledge base revision and minimal change
Artificial Intelligence
What does a conditional knowledge base entail?
Artificial Intelligence
Epistemic entrenchment in autoepistemic logic
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special issue on modal logics in knowledge representation
Unifying default reasoning and belief revision in a modal framework
Artificial Intelligence
On the Logic of Theory Change: Contraction without Recovery
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Revisions of Knowledge Systems Using Epistemic Entrenchment
Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge
Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision
Proceedings of the Workshop on The Logic of Theory Change
Concurrent dynamic epistemic logic for MAS
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
SAICSIT '06 Proceedings of the 2006 annual research conference of the South African institute of computer scientists and information technologists on IT research in developing countries
Studia Logica
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Epistemic entrenchment, as presented by Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) and Gärdenfors (1988), is a formalisation of the intuition that, when forced to choose between two beliefs, an agent will giveup the less entrenched one. While their formalisation satisfactorilycaptures the intuitive notion of the entrenchment of beliefs in a number ofaspects, the requirement that all wffs be comparable has drawn criticismfrom various quarters. We define a set of refined versions of theirentrenchment orderings that are not subject to the same criticism, andinvestigate the relationship between the refined entrenched orderings,the entrenchment orderings of Gärdenfors and Makinson, and AGM theorycontraction (Alchourrón et al., 1985). To conclude, we compare refinedentrenchment with two related approaches to epistemic entrenchment.