Templated revision

Authors:
Petra L. Van Der Westhuizen;John A. Van Der Poll;Willem A. Labuschagne
Affiliations:
University of South Africa;University of South Africa;University of Otago
Venue:
SAICSIT '06 Proceedings of the 2006 annual research conference of the South African institute of computer scientists and information technologists on IT research in developing countries
Year:
2006

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Abstract

In this paper we study the epistemic change operation of revision when the epistemic state of an agent is extended to include not only beliefs but knowledge too. An information-theoretic model of epistemic states is defined based on the notion of a templated ordering. A set of rationality postulates is defined for templated revision, which extends the AGM postulates, and a model-based representation result is provided characterising the proposed postulates. These postulates capture the intuition that during a revision, the agent's knowledge should grow monotonically while the agent's belief may grow nonmonotonically. It is shown that templated revision satisfies all the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated revision, except for the controversial postulate (C2).