Compilers: principles, techniques, and tools
Compilers: principles, techniques, and tools
A symbolic semantics for the &pgr;-calculus
Information and Computation
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Model checking security properties of control flow graphs
Journal of Computer Security
Synthesis of Local Controller Programs for Enforcing Global Security Properties
ARES '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Third International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Contract-Driven Implementation of Choreographies
Trustworthy Global Computing
Security Types for Sessions and Pipelines
Web Services and Formal Methods
A theory of contracts for Web services
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
A perspective on service orchestration
Science of Computer Programming
Local policies for resource usage analysis
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Calculi for Service-Oriented Computing
Formal Methods for Web Services
Planning and verifying service composition
Journal of Computer Security - 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 18)
Synthesis of web services orchestrators in a timed setting
WS-FM'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Web services and formal methods
Foundations of security analysis and design IV
Choreography and orchestration: a synergic approach for system design
ICSOC'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Service-Oriented Computing
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Service Oriented Computing SOC is a programming paradigm aiming at characterising Service Networks. Services are entities waiting for requests from clients and they often result from the composition of many sub-services.We address here the problem of statically guaranteeing security of open services, i.e., services with unknown components. Security constraints are expressed by policies that service components must obey.We present here a type and effect system that safely over-approximates the possible run-time behaviour of open services, collecting partial information on the behaviour of their components. From such an approximation, we then extract a partial plan that drives executions of an open system that raises no security violations when plugged in any context.