On Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models

  • Authors:
  • Scott E. Page

  • Affiliations:
  • Division of Humanities and Social Science, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, U.S.A.

  • Venue:
  • Computational Economics
  • Year:
  • 1997

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Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of incentive based asynchronous updatingin which the order of updating is determined by incentives. Previously,asynchronous updating has been shown to yield greater stability thansynchromous updating for a variety of dynamical systems. However, inthose models the order of updating is random. When incentives determinethe ordering, the dynamics and end states change. For a conformity modelon a two dimensional cellular automata, incentive based asynchronous updatingyields greater linear disparity. Fot the game of life, it results in muchgreater sensitivity to initial conditions.