Frontiers of electronic commerce
Frontiers of electronic commerce
Leveled Commitment Contracting among Myopic Individually Rational Agents
ICMAS '98 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Multi Agent Systems
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
Negotiation among self-interested computationally limited agents
The Contract Net Protocol: High-Level Communication and Control in a Distributed Problem Solver
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Advantages of a leveled commitment contracting protocol
AAAI'96 Proceedings of the thirteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Agents in E-commerce: state of the art
Knowledge and Information Systems
Cognition, Sociability, and Constraints
Balancing Reactivity and Social Deliberation in Multi-Agent Systems, From RoboCup to Real-World Applications (selected papers from the ECAI 2000 Workshop and additional contributions)
Revised Papers from the International Workshop on Infrastructure for Multi-Agent Systems: Infrastructure for Agents, Multi-Agent Systems, and Scalable Multi-Agent Systems
Reasoning about commitments in multiple concurrent negotiations
ICEC '04 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive Contract Net Protocol
SOFSEM '07 Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
A Generic Framework for Argumentation-Based Negotiation
CIA '07 Proceedings of the 11th international workshop on Cooperative Information Agents XI
Managing commitments in multiple concurrent negotiations
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
A comparison of agent decommitment techniques in a real-time environment
AIKED'10 Proceedings of the 9th WSEAS international conference on Artificial intelligence, knowledge engineering and data bases
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding, i.e., impossible to breach. Such contracts do not allow the agents to efficiently deal with future events. This deficiency can be tackled by using a leveled commitment contracting protocol which allows the agents to decommit from contracts by paying a monetary penalty to the contracting partner. The efficiency of such protocols depends heavily on how the penalties are decided. In this paper, different leveled commitment protocols and their parameterizations are empirically compared to each other and to several full commitment protocols. In the different experiments, the agents are of different types: self-interested or cooperative, and they can perform different levels of lookahead.Surprisingly, self-interested myopic agents reach a higher social welfare quicker than cooperative myopic agents when decommitment penalties are low. The social welfare in settings with agents that performed lookahead did not vary as much with the decommitment penalty as the social welfare in settings that consisted of myopic agents. For a short range of values of the decommitment penalty, myopic agents performed almost as well as agents that performed lookahead. In all of the settings studied, the best way to set the decommitment penalties was to choose low penalties, but ones that were greater than zero. This indicates that leveled commitment contracting protocols outperform both full commitment protocols and commitment free protocols.