Secure databases: protection against user influence
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
The tracker: a threat to statistical database security
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Linear queries in statistical databases
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
A fast procedure for finding a tracker in a statistical database
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Security in statistical databases for queries with small counts
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Security of statistical databases: multidimensional transformation
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Security-control methods for statistical databases: a comparative study
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
A modified random perturbation method for database security
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
Software—Practice & Experience - Focus on Selected PhD Literature Reviews in the Practical Aspects of Software Technology
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This paper describes how to compromise a statistical database which only answers queries about arithmetic means for query sets whose cardinality falls in the range [k, N - k], for some k 0, where N ≥ 2k is the number of records in the database. The compromise is shown to be easy and to require only a little preknowledge; knowing the cardinality of just one nonempty query set is usually sufficient.This means that not only count and sum queries, but also queries for arithmetic means can be extremely dangerous for the security of a statistical database, and that this threat must be taken into account explicitly by protective measures. This seems quite important from a practical standpoint: while arithmetic means were known for some time to be not altogether harmless, the (perhaps surprising) extent of the threat is now shown.