Secure databases: protection against user influence
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
The tracker: a threat to statistical database security
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Security in statistical databases for queries with small counts
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
A model of statistical database their security
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Inference from statistical data bases.
Inference from statistical data bases.
Further results on the security of partitioned dynamic statistical databases
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Protecting statistical databases: a matter of privacy
ACM SIGCAS Computers and Society
Security-control methods for statistical databases: a comparative study
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
OLAP and statistical databases: similarities and differences
PODS '97 Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM SIGACT-SIGMOD-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
Compromising statistical databases responding to queries about means
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Secure statistical databases with random sample queries
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Security of statistical databases: multidimensional transformation
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Advances in Inference Control in Statistical Databases: An Overview
Inference Control in Statistical Databases, From Theory to Practice
Randomizing, A Practical Method for Protecting Statistical Databases Against Compromise
VLDB '82 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Very Large Data Bases
Statistical Databases: Characteristics, Problems, and some Solutions
VLDB '82 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Very Large Data Bases
An Analytic Approach to Statistical Databases
VLDB '83 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Very Large Data Bases
ICSE '81 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Software engineering
Auditing for secure statistical databases
ACM '81 Proceedings of the ACM '81 conference
Database Security-Concepts, Approaches, and Challenges
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
A security model for the statistical database problem
SSDBM'83 Proceedings of the 2nd international workshop on Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Statistical Database Management
Statistical databases: their model, query language and security
SSDBM'83 Proceedings of the 2nd international workshop on Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Statistical Database Management
Optimal distribution of restricted ranges in secure statistical database
SSDBM'1990 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Statistical and Scientific Database Management
Ranges and trackers in statistical databases
SSDBM'1988 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Statistical and Scientific Database Management
Effective inference control mechanisms for securing statistical databases
AFIPS '81 Proceedings of the May 4-7, 1981, national computer conference
Impacts of information system vulnerabilities on society
AFIPS '82 Proceedings of the June 7-10, 1982, national computer conference
Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing
Foundations and Trends in Databases
Applied quantitative information flow and statistical databases
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Unauthorized inferences in semistructured databases
Information Sciences: an International Journal
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To avoid trivial compromises, most on-line statistical databases refuse to answer queries for statistics about small subgroups. Previous research discovered a powerful snooping tool, the tracker, with which the answers to these unanswerable queries are easily calculated. However, the extent of this threat was not clear, for no one had shown that finding a tracker is guaranteed to be easy.This paper gives a simple algorithm for finding a tracker when the maximum number of identical records is not too large. The number of queries required to find a tracker is at most &Ogr;(log2S) queries, where S is the number of distinct records possible. Experimental results show that the procedure often finds a tracker with just a few queries. The threat posed by trackers is therefore considerable.