ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
The tracker: a threat to statistical database security
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
A fast procedure for finding a tracker in a statistical database
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Security in statistical databases for queries with small counts
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
A model of statistical database their security
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Secure statistical databases with random sample queries
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
A security machanism for statistical database
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
Security in Databases: A Combinatorial Study
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A study on the protection of statistical data bases
SIGMOD '77 Proceedings of the 1977 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
The Design and Analysis of Computer Algorithms
The Design and Analysis of Computer Algorithms
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems
Towards robustness in query auditing
VLDB '06 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Very large data bases
L-diversity: Privacy beyond k-anonymity
ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data (TKDD)
Simulatable Binding: Beyond Simulatable Auditing
SDM '08 Proceedings of the 5th VLDB workshop on Secure Data Management
Denials leak information: Simulatable auditing
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
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A statistical database (SDB) is an ordinary database that returns statistical information to user queries. The security problem for the SDB is to control the use of the SDB so that only statistical information is available and no sequence of queries is sufficient to infer protected information about any individual. When such information is obtained, the SDB is said to be compromised. Many researchers have studied different protection mechanisms to prevent an SDB from being compromised. However, most of these mechanisms are either ineffective or inefficient or are only applicable to large SDBs. Auditing in SDBs is initially proposed in the form of investigating log trails manually. In this paper, we present a practical technique for managing the past history of user's queries, discuss how the sequence of all the answered queries of the SDB can be reduced and stored in finite storage, and describe how this storage scheme can provide an effective way of checking compromise. We believe that this will help us to develop a more practical and efficient tool for protection in a small SDB than the previously known mechanisms. We also extend the idea to batched queries and a more general environment for better protection and performance. We also state that the problem of maximizing the amount of information to the users without compromising the SDB is NP-complete.