Adaptive pricing that can withstand buyer collusion of false-type-declaration

  • Authors:
  • Shigeo Matsubara

  • Affiliations:
  • NTT Corporation, Hikaridai, Kyoto, Japan

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

Pricing goods properly is critical for the further growth of electronic commerce. One price discrimination technique drawn from microeconomics theory has shown promise as regards the trading of information services. This technique, however, has a serious drawback in that it assumes that a seller knows the distribution of buyers' preferences. Unfortunately, obtaining such data is not always easy. We can incorporate agent technologies into the technique, namely, by gathering sales data and updating information about buyers, and thus improve the performance. However, if a naive method for revising prices is employed, this adaptive pricing can end in failure because of buyer collusion. If collusion does occur, the rationality of any price revision is lost. To solve this problem, we have developed a pricing mechanism that can withstand buyer collusion. We provide a concrete method for calculating quality and price combinations based on a theoretical analysis of the mechanism, and then show its effectiveness by using computer simulation.