Contrary-to-duty reasoning with preference-based dyadic obligations

  • Authors:
  • Leendert van der Torre;Yao-Hua Tan

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Artificial Intelligence, Faculty of Sciences, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081a, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands E-mail: torre@cs.vu.nl;Euridis, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands E-mail: ytan@fac.fbk.eur.nl

  • Venue:
  • Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
  • Year:
  • 1999

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Abstract

In this paper we introduce Prohairetic Deontic Logic (PDL), a preference‐based dyadic deontic logic. In our preference‐based interpretation of obligations “&agr; should be (done) if &bgr; is (done)” is true if (1) no ¬&agr; ∧ &bgr; state is as preferable as an &agr; ∧ &bgr; state and (2) the preferred &bgr; states are &agr; states. We show that this representation solves different problems of deontic logic. The first part of the definition is used to formalize contrary‐to‐duty reasoning, which, for example, occurs in Chisholm’s and Forrester’s notorious deontic paradoxes. The second part is used to make deontic dilemmas inconsistent.