Structural Learning: Attraction and Conformity in Task-Oriented Groups

  • Authors:
  • James A. Kitts;Michael W. Macy;Andreas Flache

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Sociology, Cornell University, 323 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853. jak20@cornell.edu;Department of Sociology, Cornell University, 323 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853;Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany

  • Venue:
  • Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
  • Year:
  • 1999

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Abstract

This study extends previous research that showed howinformal social sanctions can backfire when members prefer friendshipover enforcement of group norms. We use a type of neural network tomodel the coordination of informal social control in a small group ofadaptive agents confronted with a social dilemma. This modelincorporates two mechanisms of social influence, informal sanctionsand imitation. Both mechanisms vary with the strength of the socialtie between source and target. Previous research focused on theeffects of social sanctions. Here, we demonstrate a curvilineareffect of imitation on compliance with prosocial norms. Moderatedoses of imitation reduce the coordination complexity ofself-organized collective action and help the network achievesatisfactory levels of cooperation. High doses, however, underminethe agent-based learning required to find cooperative solutions.Increasing group size also diminishes compliance due to increasedcomplexity, with larger groups requiring more imitation to overcomethe coordination problem.