The complexity of counting stable marriages
SIAM Journal on Computing
Three fast algorithms for four problems in stable marriage
SIAM Journal on Computing
Incorporating heuristic information into genetic search
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Genetic Algorithms on Genetic algorithms and their application
A study of permutation crossover operators on the traveling salesman problem
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Genetic Algorithms on Genetic algorithms and their application
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
NP-complete stable matching problems
Journal of Algorithms
Adaptation in natural and artificial systems
Adaptation in natural and artificial systems
Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
How do I marry thee? Let me count the ways
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization and Machine Learning
Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization and Machine Learning
Refined Inequalities for Stable Marriage
Constraints
Genetic Algorithms for the Traveling Salesman Problem
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Genetic Algorithms
AllelesLociand the Traveling Salesman Problem
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Genetic Algorithms
Proceedings of the 12th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation
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We describe a pair of genetic algorithmsfor solving two stable matching problems. Both stable matchingproblems we will consider involve a set of applicants for positionsand a set of employers. Each applicant and each employer preparesa rank order list of a subset of the actors in the other set.The goal is to find an assignment of applicants to employersin which if applicant a is not assigned to employer b then either a prefers his assignmentto b or b prefers its assignment toa. In other words, no applicant /employerpair can both improve their situations by dropping their currentassignments in favor of each other. Our goal will be to enumeratethe stable matchings. One of the problems we will consideris the well-known stable marriage problem, in which neither applicantnor employer preference lists are linked. In the other problem,we will allow pairs of applicants who form a couple to submitjoint rank order lists of ordered pairs of employers.