Computation and Dynamical Models of Mind

Authors:
Chris Eliasmith
Affiliations:
Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box 1073, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, MO 63130-4899, U.S.A.
Venue:
Minds and Machines
Year:
1997

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Abstract

Van Gelder (1995) has recently spearheaded a movementto challenge the dominance of connectionist and classicistmodels in cognitive science. The dynamical conception ofcognition is van Gelder‘s replacement for the computationbound paradigms provided by connectionism and classicism.He relies on the Watt governor to fulfill the role of adynamicist Turing machine and claims that the MotivationalOscillatory Theory (MOT) provides a sound empirical basisfor dynamicism. In other words, the Watt governor is to bethe theoretical exemplar of the class of systems necessaryfor cognition and MOT is an empirical instantiation of thatclass. However, I shall argue that neither theWatt governor nor MOT successfully fulfill these prescribedroles. This failure, along with van Gelder‘s peculiar useof the concept of computation and his struggle withrepresentationalism, prevent him from providing a convincingalternative to current cognitive theories.