Attractive and In-discrete

  • Authors:

  • Chris Eliasmith

  • Affiliations:

  • University of Waterloo, Department of Philosophy, Waterloo, Canada ON N2L 3G1/ E-mail: eliasmith@uwaterloo.ca

  • Venue:
  • Minds and Machines
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

I argue that dynamicism does not provide a convincing alternative to currently available cognitive theories. First, I show that the attractor dynamics of dynamicist models are inadequate for accounting for high-level cognition. Second, I argue that dynamicist arguments for the rejection of computation and representation are unsound in light of recent empirical findings. This new evidence provides a basis for questioning the importance of continuity to cognitive function, challenging a central commitment of dynamicism. Coupled with a defense of current connectionist theory, these two critiques lead to the conclusion that dynamicists have failed to achieve their goal of providing a new paradigm for understanding cognition.