Turing's analysis of computability, and major applications of it
A half-century survey on The Universal Turing Machine
The confluence of ideas in 1936
A half-century survey on The Universal Turing Machine
The Universal Turing Machine: A Half-Century Survey
The Universal Turing Machine: A Half-Century Survey
Alan Turing
The Computer from Pascal to Von Neumann
The Computer from Pascal to Von Neumann
Two Dogmas of Computationalism
Minds and Machines
Minds and Machines
The Undecidable: Basic Papers on Undecidable Propositions, Unsolvable Problems and Computable Functions
Effective Computation by Humans and Machines
Minds and Machines
Super-tasks, accelerating Turing machines and uncomputability
Theoretical Computer Science - Super-recursive algorithms and hypercomputation
Minds and Machines
Quantum Algorithms: Philosophical Lessons
Minds and Machines
Physical Computation: How General are Gandy's Principles for Mechanisms?
Minds and Machines
Turing-, Human- and Physical Computability: An Unasked Question
Minds and Machines
From Logic to Physics: How the Meaning of Computation Changed over Time
CiE '07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Computability in Europe: Computation and Logic in the Real World
What Is the Lesson of Quantum Computing?
CiE '07 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Computability in Europe: Computation and Logic in the Real World
Accelerating machines: a review
International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Systems
General relativistic hypercomputing and foundation of mathematics
Natural Computing: an international journal
On the Possibilities of Hypercomputing Supertasks
Minds and Machines
Philosophy of Mind Is (in Part) Philosophy of Computer Science
Minds and Machines
Do Accelerating Turing Machines Compute the Uncomputable?
Minds and Machines
Supertasks do not increase computational power
Natural Computing: an international journal
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We describe a possible physical device that computes a function that cannot be computed by a Turing machine. The device is physical in the sense that it is compatible with General Relativity. We discuss some objections, focusing on those which deny that the device is either a computer or computes a function that is not Turing computable. Finally, we argue that the existence of the device does not refute the Church–Turing thesis, but nevertheless may be a counterexample to Gandy's thesis.