The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
Lower bounds for the stable marriage problem and its variants
SIAM Journal on Computing
Stable marriage and indifference
CO89 Selected papers of the conference on Combinatorial Optimization
Matching Medical Students to Pairs of Hospitals: A New Variation on a Well-Known Theme
ESA '98 Proceedings of the 6th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
Inapproximability Results on Stable Marriage Problems
LATIN '02 Proceedings of the 5th Latin American Symposium on Theoretical Informatics
Strong Stability in the Hospitals/Residents Problem
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Model comparison with GenericDiff
Proceedings of the IEEE/ACM international conference on Automated software engineering
Male optimal and unique stable marriages with partially ordered preferences
CARE@AI'09/CARE@IAT'10 Proceedings of the CARE@AI 2009 and CARE@IAT 2010 international conference on Collaborative agents - research and development
The hospitals/residents problem with quota lower bounds
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
A (2 - c1/√N)-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Acyclic preference systems in p2p networks
Euro-Par'07 Proceedings of the 13th international Euro-Par conference on Parallel Processing
Complexity of the resource allocation/matching problem with weight based ceilings
ICA3PP'12 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing - Volume Part II
Cyclic stable matching for three-sided networking services
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Two-sided matching with partial information
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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The hospitals/residents problem is an extensively-studied many-one stable matching problem. Here, we consider the hospitals/ residents problem where ties are allowed in the preference lists. In this extended setting, a number of natural definitions for a stable matching arise. We present the first linear-time algorithm for the problem under the strongest of these criteria, so-called super-stability. Our new results have applications to large-scale matching schemes, such as the National Resident Matching Program in the US, and similar schemes elsewhere.