An efficient algorithm for the “optimal” stable marriage
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Three-dimensional stable matching problems
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Stable marriage and indifference
CO89 Selected papers of the conference on Combinatorial Optimization
Application-layer anycasting: a server selection architecture and use in a replicated Web service
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Hard variants of stable marriage
Theoretical Computer Science
The Hospitals/Residents Problem with Ties
SWAT '00 Proceedings of the 7th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory
Information Raining and Optimal Link-Layer Design for Mobile Hotspots
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Matching output queueing with a multiple input/output-queued switch
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Strongly stable matchings in time O(nm) and extension to the hospitals-residents problem
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
A Survey of the Stable Marriage Problem and Its Variants
ICKS '08 Proceedings of the International Conference on Informatics Education and Research for Knowledge-Circulating Society (icks 2008)
The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
Discrete Applied Mathematics
On the endogenous formation of energy efficient cooperative wireless networks
Allerton'09 Proceedings of the 47th annual Allerton conference on Communication, control, and computing
Three-Sided Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences
Algorithmica - Special Issue: Matching Under Preferences; Guest Editors: David F. Manlove, Robert W. Irving and Kazuo Iwama
Circular Stable Matching and 3-way Kidney Transplant
Algorithmica - Special Issue: Matching Under Preferences; Guest Editors: David F. Manlove, Robert W. Irving and Kazuo Iwama
Matching output queueing with a combined input/output-queued switch
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Three-sided relationship is very common in the social and economic area, e.g., the supplier-firm-buyer relationship, kidney exchange problem. The three-sided relationship can also be found in many scenarios of computer networking systems involving three types of agents, which we regard as three-sided networks. For example, in sensor networks, data are retrieved from data sources (sensors) and forwarded to users through a group of servers. In such three-sided networks, users always prefer to receive the best data services from data sources, data sources would choose servers that are more efficient to deliver their data, and servers try to satisfy more users. Such preferences form a specific cyclic relationship and how to optimally allocate network resources to satisfy preferences of all parties becomes a great challenge. In this paper, inspired by the three-sided stable matching, we model the Three-sided Matching with Size and Cyclic preference (TMSC) problem for data sources, servers and users, aiming to find a stable matching for them, where all their preferences are satisfied. TMSC is different from the traditional three-sided matching models, as each server may normally serve more than one users. We show that the problem of seeking an optimal stable matching with maximum cardinality is NP-hard and propose efficient algorithms for the restricted model of TMSC problem to find a stable matching. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithms is validated through extensive simulations.