Optimization
Software engineering with reusable components
Software engineering with reusable components
Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on information and computational economics
Automated negotiation from declarative contract descriptions
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous agents
Evaluating multiple attribute items using queries
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
The Future of Emarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms
The Future of Emarkets: Multi-Dimensional Market Mechanisms
Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Applications of flexible pricing in business-to-business electronic commerce
IBM Systems Journal
Winner determination for combinatorial auctions for tasks with time and precedence constraints
Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems: Applications in Engineering and Technology - Marco Somalvico Memorial Issue
Research on application of multi-attribute auction based on fuzzy rough set
CCDC'09 Proceedings of the 21st annual international conference on Chinese control and decision conference
A public procurement combinatorial auction mechanism with quality assignment
Decision Support Systems
Approximation schemes for deal splitting and covering integer programs with multiplicity constraints
Theoretical Computer Science
Approximation schemes for deal splitting and covering integer programs with multiplicity constraints
WAOA'04 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
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During the past few years, auctions have become popular in conducting trade negotiations on the Internet. The design of new auctions and other negotiation protocols has become an important topic for both, industry and academia. Traditional auction mechanisms allow price-only negotiations for which the winner determination is a computationally simple task. However, the need for new auction mechanisms that allow complex bids such as bundle bids and multi-attribute bids has been raised in many situations. The winner determination in these auctions is a computationally hard problem. The computational complexity has been a significant hurdle for the widespread use of these advanced auction models. In this paper, we will outline the auction design space and classify resource allocation algorithms along multiple dimensions. Then, we will explain the design of an object framework providing an API to different types of winner determination algorithms. This framework enables application programmers to specify buyer preferences, allocation rules and supplier offerings in a declarative manner, and solve the allocation problems without having to re-implement the computationally complex algorithms.