Known Plaintext Correlation Attack against RC5

  • Authors:
  • Atsuko Miyaji;Masao Nonaka;Yoshinori Takii

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-

  • Venue:
  • CT-RSA '02 Proceedings of the The Cryptographer's Track at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

We investigate a known plaintext attack on RC5 based on correlations. Compared with the best previous known-plaintext attack on RC5-32, a linear cryptanalysis by Borst, Preneel, and Vandewalle, our attack applies to a larger number of rounds. RC5-32 with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using 26.14r+2.27 plaintexts. Therefore, our attack can break RC5-32 with 10 rounds (20 half-rounds) with 263.67 plaintexts with a probability of 90%. With a success probability of 30%, our attack can break RC5-32 with 21 half-rounds by using 263.07 plaintexts.