Security Weaknesses in Bluetooth
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Correlation Properties of the Bluetooth Combiner Generator
ICISC '99 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology
On the Linear Consistency Test (LCT) in Cryptanalysis with Applications
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Linear Cryptanalysis of Bluetooth Stream Cipher
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of the bluetooth E0 cipher ssing OBDD's
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
Improved pairing protocol for bluetooth
ADHOC-NOW'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Ad-Hoc, Mobile, and Wireless Networks
Reducing the space complexity of BDD-Based attacks on keystream generators
FSE'06 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Fast Software Encryption
The conditional correlation attack: a practical attack on bluetooth encryption
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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The encryption system E0, which is the encryption system used in the Bluetooth specification, is examined. In the current paper, a method of deriving the cipher key from a set of known keystream bits is given. The running time for this method depends on the amount of known keystream available, varying from O(284) if 132 bits are available to O(273), given 243 bits of known keystream. Although the attacks are of no advantage if E0 is used with the recommended security parameters (64 bit encryption key), they provide an upper bound on the amount of security that would be made available by enlarging the encryption key, as discussed in the Bluetooth specification.