On the Complexity of Matsui's Attack

  • Authors:
  • Pascal Junod

  • Affiliations:
  • -

  • Venue:
  • SAC '01 Revised Papers from the 8th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

Linear cryptanalysis remains the most powerful attack against DES at this time. Given 243 known plaintext-ciphertext pairs, Matsui expected a complexity of less than 243 DES evaluations in 85 % of the cases for recovering the key. In this paper, we present a theoretical and experimental complexity analysis of this attack, which has been simulated 21 times using the idle time of several computers. The experimental results suggest a complexity upper-bounded by 241 DES evaluations in 85% of the case, while more than the half of the experiments needed less than 239 DES evaluations. In addition, we give a detailed theoretical analysis of the attack complexity.