The Interrogator: Protocol Secuity Analysis
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
A calculus of mobile processes, II
Information and Computation
A probabilistic poly-time framework for protocol analysis
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Authentication primitives and their compilation
Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Protection in Programming-Language Translations
ICALP '98 Proceedings of the 25th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Partial Order Reductions for Security Protocol Verification
TACAS '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems: Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on the Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2000
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
LICS '98 Proceedings of the 13th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Secure Implementation of Channel Abstractions
LICS '98 Proceedings of the 13th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Using temporal logic to specify and verify cryptographic protocols
CSFW '95 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
I/O Automaton Models and Proofs for Shared-Key Communication Systems
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Proving Trust in Systems of 2nd-Order Processes: Preliminary Results
HICSS '98 Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences-Volume 7 - Volume 7
STOC '82 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Cryptographic protocols
How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo random bits
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Theory and application of trapdoor functions
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
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While there is a great deal of sophistication in modern cryptology, simple (and simplistic) explanations of cryptography remain useful and perhaps necessary. Many of the explanations are informal; others are embodied in formal methods, particularly in formal methods for the analysis of security protocols. This note (intended to accompany a talk at the Crypto 2000 conference) describes some of those explanations. It focuses on simple models of attacks, pointing to partial justifications of these models.