A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Analysis of security protocols as open systems
Theoretical Computer Science
A bisimulation method for cryptographic protocols
Nordic Journal of Computing
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CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
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OTM '09 Proceedings of the Confederated International Workshops and Posters on On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems: ADI, CAMS, EI2N, ISDE, IWSSA, MONET, OnToContent, ODIS, ORM, OTM Academy, SWWS, SEMELS, Beyond SAWSDL, and COMBEK 2009
SP'96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE conference on Security and privacy
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We use standard linear-time temporal logic to specify cryptographic protocols, model the system penetrator, and specify correctness requirements. The requirements are specified as standard safety properties, for which standard proof techniques apply. In particular, we are able to prove that the system penetrator cannot obtain a session key by any logical or algebraic techniques. We compare our work to Meadows' method. We argue that using standard temporal logic provides greater flexibility and generality, firmer foundations, easier integration with other formal methods, and greater confidence in the verification results.