How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo-random bits
SIAM Journal on Computing
A quorum-consensus replication method for abstract data types
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How to share a secret with cheaters
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Achieving independence in logarithmic number of rounds
PODC '87 Proceedings of the sixth annual ACM Symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Secure communication using remote procedure calls
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Communications of the ACM
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Time, clocks, and the ordering of events in a distributed system
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Efficient Parallel Pseudo-Random Number Generation
CRYPTO '85 Advances in Cryptology
Probabilistic encryption & how to play mental poker keeping secret all partial information
STOC '82 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Weighted voting for replicated data
SOSP '79 Proceedings of the seventh ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
How to securely replicate services
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
A security architecture for fault-tolerant systems
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) - Special issue on computer architecture
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Access control and signatures via quorum secret sharing
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Access Control and Signatures via Quorum Secret Sharing
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Scalable secure storage when half the system is faulty
Information and Computation
Guest Editor's Introduction: High-Confidence Distributed Systems
IEEE Internet Computing
Scalable Secure Storage when Half the System Is Faulty
ICALP '00 Proceedings of the 27th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Responsive Security for Stored Data
ICDCS '03 Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Distributed Computing
Plutus: Scalable Secure File Sharing on Untrusted Storage
FAST '03 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies
An approach for fault tolerant and secure data storage in collaborative work environments
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM workshop on Storage security and survivability
SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
Secure coprocessor integration with kerberos V5
SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
Plutus: scalable secure file sharing on untrusted storage
FAST'03 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX conference on File and storage technologies
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Many distributed systems manage some form of long-lived data, such as files or data bases. The performance and fault-tolerance of such systems may be enhanced if the repositories for the data are physically distributed. Nevertheless, distribution makes security more difficult, since it may be difficult to ensure that each repository is physically secure, particularly if the number of repositories is large. This paper proposes new techniques for ensuring the security of long-lived, physically distributed data. These techniques adapt replication protocols for fault-tolerance to the more demanding requirements of security. For a given threshold value, one set of protocols ensures that an adversary cannot ascertain the state of a data object by observing the contents of fewer than a threshold of repositories. These protocols are cheap; the message traffic needed to tolerate a given number of compromised repositories is only slightly more than the message traffic needed to tolerate the same number of failures. A second set of protocols ensures that an object's state cannot be altered by an adversary who can modify the contents of fewer than a threshold of repositories. These protocols are more expensive; to tolerate t-1 compromised repositories, clients executing certain operations must communicate with t-1 additional sites.