The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Achieving independence in logarithmic number of rounds
PODC '87 Proceedings of the sixth annual ACM Symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal algorithms for Byzantine agreement
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On sharing secrets and Reed-Solomon codes
Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
Strong Verifiable Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract)
WDAG '90 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Distributed Algorithms
Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults
SFCS '85 Proceedings of the 26th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Multiparty computation with faulty majority
SFCS '89 Proceedings of the 30th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Perfectly secure message transmission
SFCS '90 Proceedings of the 31st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The round complexity of verifiable secret sharing and secure multicast
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) has proven to be a powerful tool in the construction of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. Previous results show that Unverified Secret Sharing, in which there are no requirements when the dealer is faulty during distribution of the secret, requires the same number of processors as VSS. This is counterintuitive: verification that the secret is well shared out should come at a price. In this paper, by focussing on information leaked to nonfaulty processors during verification, we separate a certain strong version of Unverified Secret Sharing (USS) from its VSS analogue in terms of the required number of processors. The proof of the separation theorem yields information about communication needed for the original VSS problem. In order to obtain the separation result we introduce a new definition of secrecy, different from the Shannon definition, capturing the intuition that "information" received from faulty processors may not be informative at all.