Hardness Results for Multicast Cost Sharing

Authors:
Joan Feigenbaum;Arvind Krishnamurthy;Rahul Sami;Scott Shenker
Affiliations:
-;-;-;-
Venue:
FST TCS '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Conference Kanpur on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
Year:
2002

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Abstract

We continue the study of multicast cost sharing from the viewpoints of both computational complexity and economic mechanism design. We provide fundamental lower bounds on the network complexity of group-strategyproof, budget-balanced mechanisms. We also extend a classical impossibility result in game theory to show that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately efficient and approximately budget-balanced.