How to simultaneously exchange secrets by general assumptions
CCS '94 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Computer and communications security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Kerberos Version 4: Inductive Analysis of the Secrecy Goals
ESORICS '98 Proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Modelling Agents' Knowledge Inductively
Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Mechanising BAN Kerberos by the Inductive Method
CAV '98 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A fair non-repudiation protocol
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On-the-fly model checking of fair non-repudiation protocols
ATVA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Automated technology for verification and analysis
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The Inductive Approach for protocol verification, extended with a formalisation of message reception and agents' knowledge, is adopted here for reasoning about non-repudiation protocols. The fair non-repudiation protocol due to Zhou and Gollmann is modelled inductively in Isabelle/HOL. The verification focuses on the validity of evidence goal: that the evidence held by each peer at the end of a session suffices to refute the other's denial of participation. The proof strategies appear to be general thus far, but the fairness goal is yet to be studied.