A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Non-repudiation in electronic commerce
Non-repudiation in electronic commerce
Finite-state analysis of two contract signing protocols
Theoretical Computer Science
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Revised Papers from the 9th International Workshop on Security Protocols
Some new attacks upon security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Formal Analysis of a Non-Repudiation Protocol
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A fair non-repudiation protocol
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Infinite State AMC-Model Checking for Cryptographic Protocols
LICS '07 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
An intensive survey of fair non-repudiation protocols
Computer Communications
Authentication Revisited: Flaw or Not, the Recursive Authentication Protocol
ATVA '08 Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis
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A fair non-repudiation protocol should guarantee, (1) when a sender sends a message to a receiver, neither the sender nor the receiver can deny having participated in this communication; (2) no principals can obtain evidence while the other principals cannot do so. This paper extends the model in our previous work [12], and gives a sound and complete on-the-fly model checking method for fair non-repudiation protocols under the assumption of a bounded number of sessions. We also implement the method using Maude. Our experiments automatically detect flaws of several fair non-repudiation protocols.