On-the-fly model checking of fair non-repudiation protocols
ATVA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Automated technology for verification and analysis
Computationally sound analysis of a probabilistic contract signing protocol
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Strategic planning for probabilistic games with incomplete information
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
The tractability of model checking for LTL: The good, the bad, and the ugly fragments
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL)
Complexity of fairness constraints for the Dolev-Yao attacker model
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
Towards the orchestration of secured services under non-disclosure policies
MMM-ACNS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Mathematical Methods, Models and Architectures for Computer Network Security: computer network security
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Only very little is known about the automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols for game-theoretic security properties. In this paper, we therefore study decidability and complexity of the model checking problem for AMC-formulas over infinite state concurrent game structures induced by cryptographic protocols and the Dolev-Yao intruder. We show that the problem is NEXPTIME-complete when making reasonable assumptions about protocols and for an expressive fragment of AMC, which contains, for example, all properties formulated by Kremer and Raskin in fair ATL for contract-signing and non-repudiation protocols. We also prove that our assumptions on protocols are necessary to obtain decidability, unless other restrictions are imposed on protocols.