Provably secure session key distribution: the three party case
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An attack on a recursive authentication protocol. A cautionary tale
Information Processing Letters
PI-Calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
PI-Calculus: A Theory of Mobile Processes
Symbolic Trace Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
ICALP '01 Proceedings of the 28th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Mechanized proofs for a recursive authentication protocol
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Semantic Model for Authentication Protocols
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Selecting theories and recursive protocols
CONCUR 2005 - Concurrency Theory
Authentication Revisited: Flaw or Not, the Recursive Authentication Protocol
ATVA '08 Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis
On the automatic analysis of recursive security protocols with XOR
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On-the-fly model checking of fair non-repudiation protocols
ATVA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Automated technology for verification and analysis
Authentication Revisited: Flaw or Not, the Recursive Authentication Protocol
ATVA '08 Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Automated Technology for Verification and Analysis
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Authentication and secrecy have been widely investigated in security protocols. They are closely related to each other and variants of definitions have been proposed, which focus on the concepts of corresponding assertion and key distribution. This paper proposes an on-the-fly model checkingmethod based on the pushdown system to verify the authentication of recursive protocols with an unbounded number of principals. By experiments of the Maude implementation, we find the recursive authentication protocol, which was verified in the sense of (weak) key distribution, has a flaw in the sense of correspondence assertion.