CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Attacks on Copyright Marking Systems
Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Information Hiding
Evaluation of Copyright Marking Systems
ICMCS '99 Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Multimedia Computing and Systems - Volume 2
A note on the limits of collusion-resistant watermarks
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Improved decoding of Reed-Solomon and algebraic-geometry codes
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Secure spread spectrum watermarking for multimedia
IEEE Transactions on Image Processing
Efficient Traitor Tracing Algorithms Using List Decoding
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Behavior forensics with side information for multimedia fingerprinting social networks
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
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Watermarking techniques allow the tracing of pirated copies of data by modifying each copy as it is distributed, embedding hidden information into the data which identifies the owner of that copy The owner of the original data can then identify the source of a pirated copy by reading out the hidden information present in that copy. Naturally, one would like these schemes to be as efficient as possible. Previous analyses measured efficiency in terms of the amount of data needed to allow many different copies to be distributed; in order to hide enough data to distinguish many users, the total original data must be sufficiently large Here, we consider a different notion of efficiency: What resources does the watermark detector need in order to perform this tracing?We address this question in two ways. First, we present a modified version of the CKLS media watermarking algorithm which improves the detector running time from linear to polylogarithmic in the number of users while still maintaining collusion-security. Second, we show that any public, invertible watermarking scheme secure against c colluding adversaries must have at least 驴(c) bits of secret information.