Information Hiding Techniques for Steganography and Digital Watermarking
Information Hiding Techniques for Steganography and Digital Watermarking
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
A Secure, Robust Watermark for Multimedia
Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information Hiding
Robust Covert Communication over a Public Audio Channel Using Spread Spectrum
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
The business case for audio watermarking
ICASSP '99 Proceedings of the Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 1999. on 1999 IEEE International Conference - Volume 04
Robust spread-spectrum audio watermarking
ICASSP '01 Proceedings of the Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 2001. on IEEE International Conference - Volume 03
Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
On the limits of steganography
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Informed detection of audio watermark for resolving playback speed modifications
Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on Multimedia and security
Bisynchronous approach for robust audio watermarking technology
PCM'07 Proceedings of the multimedia 8th Pacific Rim conference on Advances in multimedia information processing
Robust hashing for music copyright protection by combining beat segmentation and chroma
Proceedings of the international conference on Multimedia
Adaptive selection of embedding locations for spread spectrum watermarking of compressed audio
IWDW'11 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Digital-Forensics and Watermarking
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Watermarks are hidden, imperceptible, and robust marks augmented into a host signal such as audio or video. Recent studies show that in the presence of an adversary, "blind" watermark detection within an attacked clip is an exceptionally difficult task. In this paper, we explore two technologies, beat detection and block redundant coding, to combat de-synchronization and watermark estimation as two attacks that have demonstrated superior effectiveness in preventing watermark detectors from reliably accomplishing their goal. As a result, we have achieved robustness of spread-spectrum watermarks augmented in audio clips to almost arbitrary constant time-warp, pitch-bending, and wow-and-flutter of up to 1%. The adversary can remove the watermark by subtracting an estimate of the watermark from the signal with an amplitude in excess of 6dB with respect to the host. Such an attack vector typically affects substantially the fidelity of the "pirated" recording.