Theory of linear and integer programming
Theory of linear and integer programming
Forming coalitions in the face of uncertain rewards
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Coalition, cryptography, and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation in task oriented domains
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Coalition formation among rational information agents
MAAMAW '96 Proceedings of the 7th European workshop on Modelling autonomous agents in a multi-agent world : agents breaking away: agents breaking away
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Multiagent systems: a modern approach to distributed artificial intelligence
Multiagent systems: a modern approach to distributed artificial intelligence
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees
Artificial Intelligence
Customer coalitions in the electronic marketplace
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
Coalition Formation for Large-Scale Electronic Markets
ICMAS '00 Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems (ICMAS-2000)
ATAL '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII
A robust deception-free coalition formation model
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Intelligent Decision Technologies
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In the last few years the use of coalition formation algorithms in multi-agent systems has been proposed as a possible way of modelling autonomous agent cooperation. Game theory provides different concepts for the stability of solutions in cooperative games, regarding the fairness of the resultant payment configuration. One of these is the core. In this paper we present an analysis -based upon game theory- for a class of task-oriented problems arising from some Internet transactions. A procedure that guarantees an optimum task allocation is defined, and a new payoff division model is proposed for the corresponding value. We prove that the proposed payoff division lies inside the core. The whole computation (of the optimal value and the payoffs) has a polynomial complexity in the number of agents.