A robust deception-free coalition formation model

Authors:
Maria-Victoria Belmonte;Ricardo Conejo;J. L. Pérez-de-la-Cruz;Francisco Triguero
Affiliations:
Universidad de Málaga, Campus de Teatinos, Málaga, Spain;Universidad de Málaga, Campus de Teatinos, Málaga, Spain;Universidad de Málaga, Campus de Teatinos, Málaga, Spain;Universidad de Málaga, Campus de Teatinos, Málaga, Spain
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Year:
2004

Citing 1
Cited 1

A Stable and Feasible Payoff Division for Coalition Formation in a Class of Task Oriented Domains

ATAL '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII

Who Works Together in Agent Coalition Formation?

CIA '07 Proceedings of the 11th international workshop on Cooperative Information Agents XI

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Abstract

We study two properties of coalition formation algorithms, very important for their application in real-life scenarios: robustness and tolerance to some agent misbehaviors. The study is performed for a previously proposed coalition formation model-based upon game theory for a class of task-oriented problems that guarantees an optimum task allocation and a stable (fair) profit division. The results show acceptable behavior and performance.