Spawn: A Distributed Computational Economy
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Making greed work in networks: a game-theoretic analysis of switch service disciplines
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The POPCORN market—an online market for computational resources
Proceedings of the first international conference on Information and computation economies
A game-theoretic formulation of multi-agent resource allocation
AGENTS '00 Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents
Dynamic pricing by software agents
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - electronic commerce
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
A proportional share resource allocation algorithm for real-time, time-shared systems
RTSS '96 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium
Charge-Based Proportional Scheduling
Charge-Based Proportional Scheduling
Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Market mechanisms for network resource sharing
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Coalition formation in proportionally fair divisible auctions
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Game based capacity allocation for utility computing environments
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Optimal pricing in a free market wireless network
Wireless Networks
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One of the many emerging applications for software agents are their ability to serve as proxies for trade and bartering. This has led to the analysis and development of auction protocols for various goods. We consider agent-mediated allocation of computational and network resources through market mechanisms. Single-good and combinatorial auctions do not apply readily to these products, thus we propose a divisible auction that is proportionally fair and has low signaling and computational costs. The structure of the auction enables us to represent optimal responses as price functions. From this we are able to characterize agent valuations and prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. We further develop a decentralized algorithm that allows the agents to converge to the operating point without sharing private information.