Low Secret Exponent RSA Revisited

  • Authors:
  • Johannes Blömer;Alexander May

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • CaLC '01 Revised Papers from the International Conference on Cryptography and Lattices
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

We present a lattice attack on low exponent RSA with short secret exponent d = Nδ for every δ 0.265. Our method, as well as the method by Boneh and Durfee, is heuristic, since the method is based on Coppersmith's approach for bivariate polynomials. Coppersmith [6] pointed out that this heuristic must fail in some cases. We argue in this paper, that a (practically not interesting) variant of the Boneh/Durfee attack proposed in [4] always fails. Many authors have already stressed the necessity for rigorous proofs of Coppersmith's method in the multivariate case. This is even more evident in light of these results.