Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Timing analysis in low-latency mix networks: attacks and defenses
ESORICS'06 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Research in Computer Security
A context-aware scheme for privacy-preserving location-based services
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Understanding new anonymity networks from a user's perspective
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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Various systems offering anonymity for near real-time Internet traffic have been operational. However, they did not deliver many quantitative results about performance, bandwidth overhead, or other issues that arise when implementing or operating such a system. Consequently, the problem of designing and operating these systems in a way that they provide a good balance between usability, protection from attacks, and overhead is not well understood. In this paper, we present the analysis of an anonymity network for web browsing that offers a high level of anonymity against a sophisticated attacker and good end-to-end performance at a reasonable bandwidth overhead. We describe a novel way of operating the system that maximizes the protection from traffic analysis attacks while minimizing the bandwidth overhead. We deliver quantitative results about the performance of our system, which should help to give a better understanding of anonymity networks.