Competitive scenarios for heterogeneous trading agents
AGENTS '98 Proceedings of the second international conference on Autonomous agents
The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents
AGENTS '98 Proceedings of the second international conference on Autonomous agents
Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on economics of electronic commerce
Agent-Mediated Integrative Negotiation for Retail Electronic Commerce
AMET '98 Selected Papers from the First International Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Trading on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce
Computationally Manageable Combinatorial Auctions
Computationally Manageable Combinatorial Auctions
Agent-mediated electronic commerce: a survey
The Knowledge Engineering Review
Economic mechanism design for computerized agents
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
Coalition formation among bounded rational agents
IJCAI'95 Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A Rule-Driven Approach for Defining the Behaviour of Negotiating Software Agents
DCW '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Distributed Communities on the Web
Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm
Computational Economics
NegotiAuction: An experimental study
Decision Support Systems
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Many auction mechanisms, including first and second price ascendingand sealed bid auctions, have been proposed and analyzed in the economics literature. We compare the usefulness of different mechanisms for on-line auctions, focusing on the cognitive costs placed on users (e.g. the cost of determining the value of a good), the possibilities for agent mediation, and the trust properties of the auction. Different auction formats prove to be attractive for agent mediated on-line auctions than for traditional off-line auctions. For example, second price sealed bid auctions are attractive in traditional auctions because they avoid the communication cost of multiple bids in first price ascending auctions, and the "gaming" required to estimate the second highest bid in first price sealed bid auctions. However, when biddingag ents are cheap, communication costs cease to be important, and a progressive auction mechanism is preferred over a closed bid auction mechanism, since users with semi-autonomous agents can avoid the cognitive cost of placing an accurate value on a good. As another example, when an on-line auction is beingconducted by an untrusted auctioneer (e.g. the auctioneer is selling-its own items), rational participants will build biddingag ents that transform second price auctions into first price auctions.