Secure buffering in firm real-time database systems

  • Authors:
  • Binto George;Jayant R. Haritsa

  • Affiliations:
  • Database Systems Lab, Supercomputer Education and Research Centre, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560012, India/ e-mail: {binto,haritsa}@dsl.serc.iisc.ernet.in;Database Systems Lab, Supercomputer Education and Research Centre, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560012, India/ e-mail: {binto,haritsa}@dsl.serc.iisc.ernet.in

  • Venue:
  • The VLDB Journal — The International Journal on Very Large Data Bases
  • Year:
  • 2000

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Abstract

Many real-time database applications arise in electronic financial services, safety-critical installations and military systems where enforcing is crucial to the success of the enterprise. We investigate here the performance implications, in terms of killed transactions, of guaranteeing multi-level secrecy in a real-time database system supporting applications with firm deadlines. In particular, we focus on the buffer management aspects of this issue.Our main contributions are the following. First, we identify the importance and difficulties of providing secure buffer management in the real-time database environment. Second, we present , a novel buffer management algorithm that provides covert-channel-free security. SABRE employs a fully dynamic one-copy allocation policy for efficient usage of buffer resources. It also incorporates several optimizations for reducing the overall number of killed transactions and for decreasing the unfairness in the distribution of killed transactions across security levels. Third, using a detailed simulation model, the real-time performance of SABRE is evaluated against unsecure conventional and real-time buffer management policies for a variety of security-classified transaction workloads and system configurations. Our experiments show that SABRE provides security with only a modest drop in real-time performance. Finally, we evaluate SABRE's performance when augmented with the GUARD adaptive admission control policy. Our experiments show that this combination provides close to ideal fairness for real-time applications that can tolerate covert-channel bandwidths of up to one bit per second (a limit specified in military standards).