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Abstract

What if rent from a competitive advantage is appropriated so it cannot be observed in performance measures? The resourcebased view was not formulated to examine who will get the rent. Yet, this essay argues that the factors leading to a resource based advantage also predict who will appropriate rent. Knowledge-based assets are promising because firm-specificity, social complexity, and causal ambiguity make them hard to imit ate. However, the roles of internal stakeholders may grant them a great deal of bargaining power especially relative to investors. This essay integrates the resource-based view with the bargaining power literature by defining the firm as a nexus of contracts. This new lens can help to explain when rent will be generated and, simultaneously, who will appropriate it. In doing so, it provides a more robust theory of firm performance than the resource-based view alone. It is also suggested that this lens might be useful for examining other theories of firm performance.