Evaluation of strategic investments in information technology
Communications of the ACM
Journal of Management Information Systems
Information Systems Research
Optimal Investment in Knowledge Within a Firm Using a Market Mechanism
Management Science
Informational cascades in IT adoption
Communications of the ACM - Human-computer etiquette
A Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm--The Problem-Solving Perspective
Organization Science
Incentives Between Firms (and Within)
Management Science
Journal of Management Information Systems - Special section: Navigation in information-intensive environments
Information technology, incentives, and the optimal number of suppliers
Journal of Management Information Systems - Special section: Strategic and competitive information systems
Journal of Management Information Systems
Poaching and the Misappropriation of Information: Transaction Risks of Information Exchange
Journal of Management Information Systems
Information Exploitation and Interorganizational Systems Ownership
Journal of Management Information Systems
Journal of Management Information Systems
Information Technology Investment Strategies Under Declining Technology Cost
Journal of Management Information Systems
Journal of Management Information Systems
What drives global ICT adoption? Analysis and research directions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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Some economic and informational problems associated with organizational information technology (IT) spending may be attributed to managerial rent-seeking. Because of the unavoidable incompleteness of labor contracts, managers with misaligned incentives and budgetary discretion could entrench themselves through their non-value-maximizing adoption decisions. In order to boost their bargaining power in future contract renegotiation, they invest excessively in technologies they manage more effectively than their potential rivals. In addition, they tend to adopt technologies that can create large information asymmetries giving them significant knowledge advantage over their potential rivals ex post. We study the implications and effects of their rent-seeking behavior within the context of organizational IT adoption and management. The efficacies and the limitations of formal incentive contracting are discussed to underscore the need for additional governance mechanisms. While knowledge management may mitigate some of the agency problems associated with entrenchment, managerial self-policing issue remains a challenge. We further explore the incentive provision potential of relational labor contracts in combating entrenchment.